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Productivity Growth and Job Creation 




A large share of manufacturing employment, including the self-employed, in low 
income countries is accounted for by industrial clusters, namely, agglomerations of 
firms producing similar products or providing similar services in small geographical 
areas.  This is because there are economic forces making it more profitable for firms to 
operate in an industrial cluster than in isolation.  Such economic forces are termed 
localization economies after Marshall’s (1920, Book IV, Ch. X) pioneering work on the 
“localization of industry.”  What will contribute to the betterment of wage workers, 
own-account workers, and entrepreneurs in these clusters?  What can be done to 
strengthen the ability of the clusters to create jobs?  To answer these questions, we 
need a deeper understanding of the nature and the limitation of localization economies. 
Krugman (1991, Ch. 2) lists “familiar examples of localization” in the United 
States, including Silicon Valley, Route 128, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle as 
high tech centers, Hartford as an insurance city, Chicago as the center of futures trading, 
and Los Angeles as the entertainment capital.  Even casual observers, however, know 
that a large number of industrial clusters both inside and outside the United States look 
quite different from these “familiar examples.”  In developing countries, there are 
rapidly growing clusters, declining clusters, and traditional and still active clusters, but 
the majority are what Altenburg and Mayer-Stamer (1999, p.1695) call “survival 
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clusters of micro and small-scale enterprises which produce low-quality consumer 
goods for local markets.”  While almost all clusters were formed spontaneously due to 
localization economies, their performances vary considerably in growth, productivity, 
product quality, profitability, employment sizes, and wage levels. 
In an attempt to identify the reason for such considerable variance, this paper 
focuses on the issues of how managerial and innovative capacities of entrepreneurs 
interact with localization economies and diseconomies and what impacts they exert on 
the productivity and employment of industrial clusters.  We assume that 
entrepreneurship consists of innovative capacity to put new ideas into effect and 
managerial capacity to improve management efficiency given the level of technology.  
Our focus on entrepreneurship is motivated by our observation that it is in short supply 
in industrial clusters in low income countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.  As is 
well-known, localization facilitates knowledge spillovers, but this property is not 
beneficial for the development of clusters when there are no new ideas about profitable 
products, new markets, or new production processes to be spilt over or to be imitated in 
the cluster.  Localization does not encourage innovation or technology borrowing (i.e., 
learning from abroad), but rather dampens them by facilitating rampant spillovers or 
imitation.  While localization may attract diverse human resources, such as skilled 
workers, engineers, and traders in one place, entrepreneurs may be unable to find a new 
useful combination of these resources if their imagination, perspective, effort, or 
perseverance happens to be insufficient.  There is no reason to assume that localization 
automatically nurtures innovative capacity.  Likewise, localization does not nurture 
managerial capacity to execute plans aimed at management improvement effectively. 
This is not to say that industrial clusters are useless.  On the contrary, industrial 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-22
3 
 
clusters provide numerous benefits for firms and their workers within the clusters.  For 
example, the localization of industry saves on the cost of building infrastructure, 
enhances the development of markets for skilled labor, and attracts buyers and material 
suppliers.  It also reduces transaction costs that arise from information asymmetry and 
imperfect contract enforcement.  With low transaction costs, the division and 
specialization of labor among firms are promoted and the provision of trade credits is 
facilitated in industrial clusters.  Of course, there are localization diseconomies as well.  
For example, infrastructure may be overused resulting in serious congestion problems, 
and the developed labor market may accelerate job hopping.  Yet the fact that a large 
number of firms are located in clusters indicates that localization economies outweigh 
localization diseconomies.  The question is how to nurture entrepreneurship while 
taking full advantage of localization economies in existing and new industrial clusters 
without aggravating localization diseconomies. 
We use a simple model of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in an industrial 
cluster to understand why managerial capacity impacts on the cluster’s capacity for job 
creation.  In the model, the major task of management is to maintain control of output, 
quality, delivery, and costs, as emphasized by Deming (1982) and Toyota’s Production 
System.  Compared with managerial capacity, innovative capacity may be elusive and 
manifest itself in various ways.  According to case studies compiled by Schmitz and 
Nadvi (1999) and Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, 2011), however, it is similar or almost the 
same set of innovations that boosted cluster-based industrial development in different 
industries in different countries.  Two hypotheses emerge from these discussions in this 
paper.  First, in stagnant clusters, firms have almost equally small employment sizes, 
their labor productivity fluctuates wildly, particularly among smaller firms, and, in a 
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cross section of firms, no clear association is found between labor productivity and 
employment sizes.  Second, in dynamically growing clusters, employment size varies 
among firms, labor productivity has small variances particularly among large firms, and 
there is a positive association between labor productivity and employment sizes.          
The empirical part of this paper uses enterprise data collected in industrial clusters 
in Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Vietnam, and China, with quite different 
characteristics and growth performances.  The data are consistent with the view that 
firms’ employment sizes are small if production fluctuates wildly, a reflection of bad 
management.  The data provide suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that 
employment size is not closely associated with labor productivity in the absence of 
innovations.  By contrast, in the clusters that have experienced innovations, 
employment sizes have grown rapidly and are associated positively with labor 
productivity. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly reviews 
the factors associated with productivity, including localization economies and 
diseconomies.  In Section 3, we develop a model highlighting the impact of managerial 
capacities on labor employment.  In Section 4, we discuss innovations in industrial 
clusters and advance hypotheses.  Section 5 documents the empirical findings based on 
the selected case studies.  Section 6 discusses policy implications and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Localization economies and diseconomies 
     According to Mokyr (2005, pp. 1116 - 1117), there is a growing recognition 
among economic historians that technological change was less important than 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-22
5 
 
institutional changes in explaining episodes of economic growth before the Industrial 
Revolution.  “The presence of peace, law and order, improved communication and 
trust . . .  enforceable and secure property rights, and similar institutional 
improvements” reduce transaction costs and, hence, enable agents to specialize 
according to their comparative advantage and to take advantage of economies of scale.  
Such commercial progress, sometimes referred to as “Smithian Growth,” can be more 
important than technological progress or “Schumpeterian Growth.”1   
     “Smithian Growth” is commonly found probably in all industrial clusters.  
Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that transaction costs or coordination costs due to 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect enforcement are generally low in 
industrial clusters where transacting parties are located near each other.  Low 
transaction costs facilitate the division of labor among manufacturers and traders, which, 
as Marshall (1920) mentions, enables manufacturers to use specialized machinery at 
high utilization rates.  Moreover, the division of labor enables manufacturers to 
procure materials and parts flexibly and to specialize in a narrow range of the 
production process, which saves both working capital and fixed capital (Ruan and 
Zhang, 2009).  The community mechanism found in industrial clusters differs from the 
one found in a traditional village community that closes its doors to outsiders and is 
counterproductive to the expansion of business networks (Babur and Sonobe, 2012).  
The pseudo community mechanism that is intentionally used to reduce transaction costs 
and to survive market competition accepts the entry of outsiders and is suitable to 
expansion (Hayami, 2009).    
                                                  
1 The concepts of “Smithian Growth” and “Schumpeterian Growth” were pioneered by Parker 
(1984). 
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     In low-income countries, not just transaction costs arising from information and 
enforcement problems but also physical transport costs are high due to the shortage of 
infrastructure (Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran, 2008).  Industrial clusters or the 
localization of industry can be viewed as a grassroots countermeasure to this problem 
because being located near each other saves on the use of infrastructure.  Other virtues 
of localization economies in relation to “Smithian Growth” include the clusters’ ability 
to facilitate matching between job seekers with special skills and employers, which was 
pointed out by Marshall (1920), and the clusters’ ability to pull in more customers 
without paying for advertising.  Both reduce search costs.  In addition, industrial 
clusters facilitate knowledge spillovers, as was also pointed out by Marshall (1920), so 
that new ideas of business spread quickly within clusters.   
     Syverson’s (2011) list of the determinants of productivity at the firm or plant level 
has two broad categories: factors operating within the plant or firm, and external drivers 
of productivity differences.  The latter consists of productivity spillovers, competition, 
deregulation or proper regulation, and flexible input markets.  Note that the 
localization of industry activates three of these four external drivers if a flexible input 
market is akin to the developed division of labor among firms.  It is little wonder that 
most industries that have developed spontaneously are cluster-based.  
     Industrial clusters, however, have no advantage in the category of internal drivers 
of productivity differences, which include managerial practice/talent, higher-quality 
general labor and capital inputs, information technology and R&D, learning by doing, 
product innovation, and firm structure designs, according to Syverson (2011).  
Moreover, the localization of industry may be counterproductive to some of these 
drivers.  For example, managerial talents and higher-quality labor of a firm may be 
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poached by other firms in the same cluster because of spillovers of information on 
talents and skills.  Similarly, the output of R&D and product innovation of a firm may 
be quickly imitated by other firms in the same cluster before the innovator reaps profits, 
which will discourage innovative activities.  These are examples of localization 
diseconomies.  Among other examples of localization diseconomies are the congestion 
problem, which arises from the inadequate provision of infrastructure, and the danger of 
chain-reaction bankruptcies of parts suppliers, assemblers, and traders, which arises 
from the thoughtless provision of and dependence on trade credits perpetuated by 
inertia. 
     Notwithstanding localization diseconomies, industrial clusters can have 
innovations in products, production processes, marketing, material procurements, and 
the organizational design of firms, as the compilation of case studies of cluster-based 
industrial development in Latin America and East Asia by Schmitz (1999) and Sonobe 
and Otsuka (2006) attests.  According to these case studies, an industry in developing 
countries begins by producing a low-quality imitation of an imported product.  It is 
initially difficult for the pioneering producer to produce and market the product because 
of the lack of appropriate materials and because both the product and the producer are 
unknown to potential buyers.  Once these difficulties are overcome, however, the 
pioneer earns high profits because of the absence of competitors.  Observing the high 
profits, there will be followers, including the former workers of the pioneer, who 
faithfully imitate the pioneer’s production and marketing methods.  This initiation 
process of an industry may be viewed as “Schumpeterian Growth,” but it is short-lived 
and followed by the “Smithian Growth” that is characterized by the formation of a 
cluster by the massive entry of imitators, who seldom improve products and production 
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processes, and the development of the division and specialization of labor among 
enterprises.  Thus, Sonobe and Otsuka (2006) refer to this process of cluster formation 
as “quantity expansion.”  
     The new entry of imitators will continue as long as they expect positive profits.  
Unless a new market is developed, increases in the supply of their product to the local 
market will eventually lower their product price and hence the profitability of 
continuing to produce this product.  A comparative study in Asia and Africa by Sonobe 
and Otsuka (2011) finds that most clusters in Sub-Saharan Africa have reached or are 
reaching their long-run equilibrium with zero profit.  Such clusters are nothing but 
“survival clusters” of MSEs, to use the terminology of Altenburg and Mayer-Stamer 
(1999).  Many clusters in this region have yet to have had even an indication that 
“Schumpeterian Growth” is on the horizon, whereas many clusters in East Asia have 
experienced such growth.    
      
3. Managerial Capacities 
     Although management performs diverse functions, we focus on one of the basic 
functions; that is, to maintain control of quality, output, delivery, and costs.  We use a 
simple model to illustrate how this function is related to the firm’s and the industrial 
cluster’s capacity for job creation.  Consider a firm producing a single product by 
using a technology characterized by a production function, x ≤ F(L), where L is labor 
input.  The function is assumed to be increasing, concave, and twice differentiable, i.e., 
F'(L) > 0, F''(L) < 0.  While function F gives the maximized output corresponding to 
input L under normal conditions, actual output x may fluctuate for reasons described 
shortly so that x = F(L), where  is a random variable with mean  and variance 2.  
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The profit is given by  = pF(L) – wL, where p is the product price and w is the wage 
rate, which the MSE takes as given.   
Fluctuation or variation in output arises from human fallibility.  It is a result of 
accidents, errors, or mistakes, such as machine failures, workers’ injuries, spoiled 
materials, the delayed supply of materials and parts, and the use of wrong parts.  These 
accidents, errors, or mistakes may be attributed partly to inadequate production plans 
and product designs and partly to the lack of work standards or the established way the 
workers do their jobs.  In addition, there may be the ebb and flow of morale among 
workers.  When serious accidents occur simultaneously and when morale among 
workers is low, actual output x will be much smaller than F(L) and can be negative if we 
interpret px as value added (roughly equal to sales minus material cost).  For example, 
a large part of the output may be rejected by the buyers on the grounds that the product 
quality is substandard.  Thus, the mean output F(L) is smaller than F(L), even though 
actual output can exceed F(L) when there are no accidents and a higher-than-normal 
level of work morale is maintained. 
 
Risk aversion 
The fluctuation is harmful when the decision maker is risk-averse.  Consider a 
risk-averse MSE owner, who maximizes expected utility E[U()], where U is a concave 
utility function.  It is well-known that if U is an exponential utility function and  is 
distributed normally, this utility maximization is equivalent to  
 
 Max  E() – ½ V(),      (1) 
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where  is the constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion and V() is the variance of 
.  Although p may be a random variable, we assume for a while that  is the only 
source of risk.  Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten 
 
 Max  pF(L) – wL – ½ [pF(L)]22.    (2) 
 
The first-order condition is  
 
 p[ –  pF(L*)2]F'(L*) = w.     (3)  
 
This result is depicted in Figure 1.  The employment size that maximizes the expected 
utility, L*, is given by point E at which the downward-sloping curve representing the 
left-hand side of equation (3) cuts the horizontal line that shows the wage rate w.  The 
variance, together with risk aversion, makes the downward-sloping curve located below 
the mean marginal product of labor curve pF'(L) and steep particularly for small 
values of L, thereby limiting the firm’s employment capacity to a low level.   
     In the presence of risk aversion, what is the consequence of the fluctuation for job 
creation?  It is clear from equation (3) and Figure 1 that individual firms’ labor 
employment, L, decreases as variance 2 increases.  It is also clear from equation (2) 
that the certainty equivalent profit also decreases as 2 increases.  Consider two 
clusters which are identical except that a large variance 2H prevails in one cluster and a 
low variance 2L prevails in the other.  They supply their products to different markets 
but these markets happen to share the same demand curves p(Z) where Z is the total 
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output of a cluster.  We assume the two clusters share the same wage rates, which are 
exogenous to each cluster.  It should be clear that the high-variance cluster has a lower 
certainty equivalent profit and a smaller employment size (i.e., L*H < L*L) if they have 
the same price p.  In the long-run equilibrium, a typical MSE owner’s certainty 
equivalent profit is driven down to zero, because whenever it is positive, a new entrant 
will imitate the incumbents’ businesses and start its own business, increasing the total 
output of the cluster, Z, and lowering the output price along the demand curve p(Z) in 
the local market.  It is easy to show that the long-run equilibrium employment in the 
high-variance cluster n*HL*H is smaller than that in the low-variance cluster n*LL*L, 
where n*H and n*L are the long-run equilibrium number of firms in the high- and 
low-variance clusters, respectively.  
 
Overproduction, stock shortage, and waiting 
     Not all MSE owners are risk-averse.  Some MSE owners operate several 
businesses, such as operating a retail store and renting tricycles to drivers.  These 
affluent MSE owners may behave like risk-neutral decision makers.  It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that their labor employment is given by the intersection 
point D at which pF'(L) = w in Figure 1.  To see why, consider a firm producing more, 
sooner, or faster than required by customers.  Such overproduction will cause the 
otherwise unnecessary time and cost of transporting excessive output between the 
workshop and the warehouse and may cause the deterioration of output, on the one hand.  
On the other hand, if the inventory is too small, it is difficult to meet the sudden demand 
of customers.  Thus, both overproduction and stock shortages are costly. 
Suppose that these costs, C, increase with the gap between the actual and average 
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levels of output at an increasing rate, or that C = c [F(L) – F(L)]2 where c is a positive 
constant.2  In this case, the expected profit, which the risk-neutral owner maximizes, is 
written 
 
 E() = pF(L) – wL – cF(L)22,     (4) 
 
and the first-order condition for the maximization is 
 
 [p – 2cF(L)2]F'(L) = w.     (5) 
 
Excessive inventory occurs all along the production line.  Except for a very 
small firm, such as a tailor shop where each sewer sews a whole piece of clothing alone, 
firms divide their entire production process into shorter processes.  If a worker 
produces more, sooner, or faster than required by the next process, there will be an 
unnecessary stock of work in process between the processes.  If the worker produces 
less or later or slower than required by the next process, the worker in the next process 
will have to stand or sit idle.  These costs of overproduction and waiting may be 
captured by a quadratic function, c[1F1(L1) – 2F2(L2)]2, where 1F1(L1) and 2F2(L2) 
are the actual output of processes 1 and 2.  The expected inventory cost is proportional 
to 2F1(L1)2 + 2F2(L2)2 – 2Cov[1F1(L1), 2F2(L2)] + [1F1(L1) – 2F2(L2)]2, where 
i and i2 are the mean and variance of i.  Toyota’s Lean Manufacturing System 
regards overproduction, waiting, and keeping more than the minimum stock as wastes 
                                                  
2 Suppose alternatively that the inventory cost is c[F(L) – m]2 where m depends on the size of the 
warehouse.  If m can be freely chosen, the inventory cost is minimized when m = F(L). 
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to be eliminated. 
It should be clear that after taking into consideration these costs of fluctuation, the 
marginal value product goes down quickly as employment L increases, like curve AE in 
Figure 1.  Thus, the same reasoning applies as before, and it can be easily shown that 
the long-run equilibrium employment in a cluster with high variances is smaller than 
that in a cluster with low variances. 
 
Why is wild fluctuation left uncured? 
     Managers should take preventive actions to reduce accidents, mistakes, and errors 
that give rise to the fluctuations described above.  The root cause of each abnormality 
should be sought out, which should be followed by planning a change aimed at 
improvement, testing the change on a small scale, studying the result, and adjusting the 
new practice so that the variation in output is kept within a predicted range and the cost 
is predictable.  Once the new practice is stabilized, a higher goal for a further 
improvement can be set, and efforts toward it are made through the plan-do-check-act 
(PDCA) cycle, which is also known as the Deming cycle and the Shewhart cycle and 
emphasized in Kaizen, a common-sense, low-cost approach to management (Imai, 
1997).  The successful application of the PDCA cycle will reduce variance 2, 
increase mean , and accordingly increase the certainty equivalent profit.  Of course, 
what is important is the knowledge and adoption of new practices that effectively 
prevent abnormalities from occurring, rather than the PDCA cycle.  One may go 
through a process similar to the PDCA cycle, whether one knows it or not.  The 
knowledge of the PDCA cycle, however, will make business owners more consciously 
aware of the need for deliberate planning and execution toward improvement. 
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     In Japan, the PDCA cycle was unknown until W. Edwards Deming began 
teaching it in Japan in 1950.  Since then, it has spread first among large firms and then 
to small and medium firms and has infiltrated itself, together with other major concepts 
of Kaizen, throughout Japan.  It is now widely used also in other parts of East Asia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and other parts of Southeast Asia, where there are a large number 
of Japanese firms and their subsidiaries operating.  In addition, it is used in rapidly 
growing industries in South Asia, such as the garment industry and the pharmaceutical 
industry in Bangladesh and the automobile industry in India.  As Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2010) argue, however, the international diffusion of managerial innovations 
takes a long time.  It is little wonder then that Kaizen, the Lean Manufacturing System, 
and other managerial innovations have not reached MSEs in low-income countries. 
     Moreover, many MSEs in low-income countries suffer from a more primitive and 
hence more serious problem of not keeping any records of transactions, customers, 
suppliers, inventories of materials, work-in-process, and products, employment, or 
production.3  Thus, it is not easy for the entrepreneurs to distinguish what is normal 
from what is abnormal.  In our notation, it would be difficult for them to recognize 
precisely how high or low the realization of  is relative to , and, hence, how much 
they lose from the risk due to the fluctuation of .  Clearly, the lack of record keeping 
makes it difficult to recognize the significance of the problem of leaving variance 2 
large, let alone to remedy the problem.   
     Such shoddy management is a constraint on job creation.  Firms in a survival 
cluster look similar: they produce the same products by using the same technology and 
                                                  
3 See De Mel, Woodruff, and McKenzie (2009), Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2010), and Mano et al. 
(2012) among others for more detailed descriptions of this problem. 
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sell the product in the same local market for a long time.  But some are larger than 
others in size.  Suppose that all firms share the same means  but different variances 
2 of the random variable .  If we measure the average labor product (APL) by value 
added divided by the number of workers (or the number of workers times the number of 
months in operation) and plot the data on Figure 1, the data points for firms with small 
employment size (like L*) would be more widely distributed (around point B) than the 
data points for larger firms, as illustrated by the three sets of vertically scattered dots in 
Figure 1.  In this example, the larger firms have a lower mean of the average labor 
product than smaller firms.  Of course, this is not always the case because larger firms 
may have higher efficiency or higher mean .  But we cannot say that firm size is 
positively associated with labor productivity.  This is somewhat counterintuitive 
because we tend to think that larger firms are more productive.  The lesson from 
Figure 1 is that to what extent management can stabilize variation in output is a major 
determinant of the employment size in clusters that do not have innovations. 
 
4. Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Industrial Clusters 
     Baumol, Schilling, and Wolff (2009, p.712) define innovative entrepreneurs as 
individuals “engaged in enterprises that offer new products, or new production 
processes, enter new market, etc.”  In some industrial clusters in low-income countries, 
there are MSE owners who find new markets for their products in remote areas or in 
neighboring countries.  They are innovative entrepreneurs.  In many cases, however, 
their products are low-quality and purchased only by low-income consumers.  It is 
difficult for them to make inroads into rapidly growing markets in emerging economies 
or into large markets in developed countries.   
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According to the case studies of successfully developed industrial clusters in 
Latin America, East Asia, and South Asia, a real breakthrough begins with 
improvements of product quality followed by branding and the establishment of new 
distribution systems (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Sonobe and Otsuka, 2006, 2011).  
Before the improvement of product quality, the product price is a function of the market 
supply of the product, p(Z).  By contrast, after the quality improvement, if product 
differentiation is successful, the firm can have price setting power and the price is a 
function of its own output x as well as the total supply, p(x, Z).  Branding is important 
because product differentiation is profitable only when the improved quality is 
recognized by consumers.  New distribution channels, such as own retail shops and 
sales agents who deal exclusively in the affiliated firm’s products, are important because 
brand names can be stolen and because ordinary traders and retailers deal in a mixture 
of the improved products and low-quality products, which undermines the effectiveness 
of product differentiation.  
     The quality improvement and the marketing reform increase the profit from other 
complementary changes.  One is to strengthen the long-term relationship with reliable 
suppliers that produce high-quality parts and components necessary for the high-quality 
product.  This is important to secure a stable supply and to prevent new designs from 
being stolen.  Another major change is the expansion of the production capacity.  This 
is also complementary with quality improvement and the marketing reform, because the 
establishment of the brand name strengthens sales, and because mass selling helps the 
brand name spread to every corner of a country or a region.  To profit from this 
circular causation, there must be mass production.  It can be achieved through the 
acquisition of other firms or through the construction of new factories.  
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     An innovative entrepreneur, who began making the breakthrough, may design a 
few of these complementary changes and reforms alone but not all.  He or she may 
have to learn from someone else to continue.  But if these changes and reforms are 
new not only to the industrial cluster but also to the country, the entrepreneur will have 
to learn from abroad.  Thus, technology borrowing in a broad sense including 
marketing and organizational knowledge assumes considerable importance. 
     Suppose that the product quality has been improved, that a brand name has been 
established, that the stable supply of high-quality intermediate inputs has been secured, 
that the secret of product design is well kept, that a mass selling distribution system 
appropriate for the branded product has been established, and that mass production 
facilities have been installed.  All these reforms and changes will not bear fruit if the 
whole organization is not managed appropriately.  Compared with MSEs, the firm in 
this stage has to tackle far more complicated cash flow management, incentive problems, 
quality control, marketing, and procurement, conflicts between divisions within the firm,  
and public relations.  Since the entrepreneur may not be able to deal with all these 
problems alone, he or she will hire specialist managers and delegate the duties if such 
managers are available.  The mutually complementary changes and reforms, complete 
with such strengthened management, compose the multifaceted innovation. 
     Based on the arguments about management and innovation in the previous section 
and this section, we would like to advance the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  In survival clusters, employment size is small, labor productivity has 
large variances particularly among smaller firms, and there is no 
association between labor productivity and employment sizes.  
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Hypothesis 2:  In dynamically growing clusters experiencing multifaceted innovations, 
employment size varies, labor productivity has small variances 
particularly among large firms, and there is a positive association 
between labor productivity and employment sizes.     
 
5. Case Studies 
In this section, we confront the above hypotheses with enterprise data collected in 
two industrial clusters in China and one each in Vietnam, Ghana, Ethiopia, and 
Bangladesh.  This empirical exercise is not intended to perform rigorous hypothesis 
testing, but rather to provide suggestive evidence.  The six clusters that we take up 
here as examples have different degrees of success in multifaceted innovation, as will be 
explained shortly.  Table 1 shows each cluster’s location, main product, population of 
firms producing final goods, the mean and median of employment size and labor 
productivity (which is defined as value added divided by the number of workers).   
Figure 2 consists of 12 panels of scatterplots showing the distributions of 
employment size and labor productivity in these six clusters for two years.  The 
summary statistics of these distributions are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.  
The vertical axis of the scatterplots measures the monthly value added per worker in US 
dollars as labor productivity.4  The horizontal axis measures the logarithm of the 
number of workers.5  The scatterplots share the same scale on each axis to allow 
comparison among the clusters and are useful for seeing whether the data are consistent 
with our hypotheses.  Later in this section, we will turn to Table 3, which presents the 
                                                  
4 This monthly value added per worker is not the value added per worker in a particular month, but 
it is the value added in a year divided by the number of months worked and the number of workers. 
5 The numbers, 3, 30, and 300 on the horizontal axis stand for 3 persons, 30 persons, and 300 
persons. 
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results of some randomized controlled experiments in which basic management training 
was provided for entrepreneurs.   
Cluster 1 produces sweater and other knitwear items for an export market in 
Eastern Europe and for a small domestic market in the northern provinces in Vietnam 
(Nam, Sonobe, and Otsuka, 2009).  Geographically, the cluster is small and coincides 
with a village. Our sample is nearly equal to the population of knitwear firms in this 
cluster.  The quality of the cluster’s products was improved when exporting began, but 
subsequently, no firm in the cluster has pursued quality improvement at a higher level to 
establish a well-known brand name.  Several firms adopt the factory production system 
employing more than 100 workers, but all other firms rely heavily on a large number of 
household subcontractors in neighboring villages for a substantial part of the production 
process.  In their busy season, almost all the assembly workshops look chaotic with 
work in process piled up randomly on dirty floors.  The owners have only the faintest 
idea how to motivate workers to pay attention to machinery maintenance, quality 
control, and synchronization between processes.  Their warehouses are full of 
packaged products piled up before and during the busy season.  It is sometimes 
impossible or at least takes time to find the stock of items of particular designs and 
colors that their customers want.  Towards the end of the busy season, they see how 
much they have overproduced.  The same mistake has been repeated for years.  
Moreover, the knitwear firms face large fluctuations in demand from year to year 
because the demand is strongly affected by the temperature in winter and by changing 
fashions. 
It is little wonder that these firms’ labor productivity has a very large variance as 
shown in Figure 2-1a.  Note, however, that while we are talking about the random 
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variation in labor productivity at each firm, the figure shows the variation among firms 
in a cross section.  Can we take the width of the distribution of dots in the vertical 
direction at each employment size as indicating wild fluctuations in labor productivity?  
This is a legitimate question because in theory, if some firms always have a higher 
productivity than other firms, variance exists and can be large even if there is no 
fluctuation within firms.  In reality, however, labor productivity fluctuates wildly 
within firms in this cluster.  As column (7) of Table 1 shows, the autocorrelation of 
labor productivity between two consecutive years 2009 and 2010 is as low as 0.38, 
which is lower than the autocorrelation between 1995 and 2000 in Cluster 5 and much 
lower than the autocorrelation between two consecutive years in Cluster 6.  If labor 
productivity were not fluctuating within firms, Figure 2-1a would be hard to understand.  
For example, not a few firms had negative value added per worker in 2009 as shown in 
Figure 2-1a.  It is hard to believe that they had had negative value added every year.  
Similarly, if some small firms had always had very high value added per worker, it 
would be difficult to understand why they remain so small in size.  Thus, the width of 
the distribution of the dots in the vertical direction at each employment size is likely to 
reflect the variance of the fluctuating labor productivity of the firms to a significant 
degree. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the variance is large particularly among smaller 
firms, and labor productivity is not positively associated with employment size.  
Interestingly, a comparison between Figures 2-1a and 2-1b establishes that the variance 
in labor productivity in 2010 is much smaller than that in 2009.  This reduction in the 
variance is likely to be the result of a management training program that we provided in 
cooperation with the World Bank just before the busy season in 2010 as an experiment.  
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There were two types of treatment: classroom training and on-site consultation.  
Nearly three quarters of our sample received either one type or both types of treatment.  
As we will explain shortly, there is strong evidence that the training had impacts on the 
management practices of the training participants.  Moreover, there is no doubt that 
knowledge spilt over from the participants to non-participants because everyone in the 
village was a sibling, relative, school friend, or neighbor of the participants.6  Thus, it 
is likely to be the good effects of the management training on the participants and, to a 
lesser degree, on the non-participants that reduced the variance in their labor 
productivity, even though the mean of the employment sizes and that of the productivity, 
as shown in Table 1, did not yet increase significantly in 2010.  
Cluster 2 is now a typical survival cluster, even though it is huge in terms of the 
number of firms, which reflects its long period of quantity expansion.  The cluster is 
located in the country’s second largest city where the two artery roads from the seacoast 
become one leading to the inland arid region, and has an extraordinarily large number of 
car repairers fixing large trucks as well as passenger cars.  The target of our case study 
there, however, is a minority group consisting of about 1000 metalworking firms.  
They are located in the car repair cluster because of the abundant availability of used 
metal as well as the demand for repair parts and other metal products consumed within 
the cluster and in the inland region.  Our sample accounts for about 15 percent of this 
population of metalworking firms, and about one third of our sample were invited to a 
management training program toward the end of 2007 (Mano et al., 2012).  This 
training program was also provided by the World Bank as an experiment.   
                                                  
6 According to our interviews with the sample entrepreneurs, everything related to the training 
program was the talk of the town during the program. 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-22
22 
 
The dominant mode of employment in this cluster is self-employment.  Owners 
of business are called masters and they teach apprentices.  For the last decade, almost 
all masters have paid at least a small amount of money to their apprentices.  Thus, we 
count the apprentices as workers.  Since many apprentices become masters after 
several years of training, firms producing the same products proliferate, which lowers 
the product prices and, hence, the profitability.  As shown in Figures 2-2a and 2-2b, 
Cluster 2 has a small employment size.  The variance in the measured labor 
productivity is smaller in Cluster 2 than in Cluster 1, probably because the demand for 
metalwork products made in Cluster 2 is more stable than the demand for knitwear 
products made in Cluster 1.  Still the variance of labor productivity in Cluster 2 is large 
compared with the other clusters, as we will see below.  A simple and astonishing 
finding from the above mentioned management training program in Cluster 2 is that 
only one out of four masters kept records of transactions and none separated household 
or personal finances from firm finances (Mano et al, 2012).  Figures 2-2a and 2-2b 
indicate that firms with relatively large employment size have smaller variance in labor 
productivity and that there is no association between labor productivity and employment 
size, consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Cluster 3, a leather-shoe cluster in Ethiopia, may be classified as something 
between a survival cluster and a dynamic cluster (Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka, 2009).  
The five largest firms have begun multifaceted innovation, but one thousand or more 
firms remain informal, very small in employment size, and continue completely manual 
production.  Leather-shoe making was initiated in the early 20th century by Armenian 
traders, who taught the skills to Ethiopian workers.  In the late 1990s, Addis Ababa 
was said to have more than 1000 self-employed shoemakers and more than 100 
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workshops and factories.  In the early 2000s, the industry was hit by a flood of cheap 
leather shoes imported from China, which would reduce the number of local producers 
by a few hundred.  A few years later, however, consumers began buying domestically 
produced leather shoes again because they had found that the shoes imported from 
Chines were of low quality.  This is why the average employment size of the sample 
firms declined from 2000 to 2004 as shown in Table 1.   
It was said in the cluster that the China shock somehow hit relatively large 
factories harder financially than self-employed workshops.  Indeed, some large firms 
stopped or drastically reduced production.  This reduced the price of the relatively 
high-quality leather that they had used, thereby benefitting the self-employed 
workshops, which could not afford to buy high-quality leather before the China shock.  
By 2004, the market demand for locally produced shoes began increasing and, more 
importantly, some large firms began improving product quality and production 
processes by borrowing technology from abroad, particularly from Italy.  As the 
derived demand for high-quality leather recovered, the self-employed workshops 
became unable to buy such leather.  This is why the labor productivity of the smallest 
firms was higher in 2000 than in 2004, as shown in Figure 2-3a.  As of the end of 2011, 
large firms are successfully exporting their products to Europe and Middle East as well 
as to neighboring African countries.  Their success should not come as a surprise 
because of their abundant endowment of low-wage labor and their high management 
capacities manifested in the relatively small variance of labor productivity as shown in 
Figures 2-3a and 2-3b. 
     Cluster 4, a garment cluster in China, has an even smaller variance in labor 
productivity (see Figures 2-4a and 2-4b).  Firms in this cluster produce children’s 
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clothes and market them in provincial cities in China and export to Russia.  In the 
1990s, they were faced with increasing competition from an increasing number of firms 
producing children’s wear within the cluster and outside (Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka, 
2002).  Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), Syverson (2011), and Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007, 2010) argue based on solid empirical evidence that increasing market 
competition necessitates improvements in management capacities.  Probably, a reason 
why Cluster 4 could meet this need may lie in the abundant availability of experienced 
managers.  The main source would be state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the nearby 
cities, Shanghai and Hangzhou.  This region, the Southern Yangtze River region, is 
known for its successful industrial development based on the massive transfer of 
knowledge from SOEs to the township and village enterprises (TVEs) (Otsuka, Liu, and 
Murakami, 1998).  It is easy to imagine that as many TVEs in the region did, firms in 
Cluster 4 would benefit from knowledge transfer in the form of SOE engineers and 
managers’ weekend guidance, the employment of retired engineers and managers from 
SOEs, and the headhunting of SOEs’ active engineers and managers.   
     During the 1990s, the firms in Cluster 4 shifted their product line toward higher 
value-added items and accordingly their marketing channel from selling in the 
marketplace in the cluster to direct transactions with large retailers and wholesalers 
from distant cities (Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka, 2002).  Starting with these changes, the 
firms seemed to extend their targets of reforms to achieve multifaceted innovation, even 
though we do not have data on this process.  What we know about this cluster after 
2000 is that it ranked among the world’s largest producers of children’s wear (Fleisher 
et al., 2010).   
     As to Cluster 5, we have data that cover the period of its multifaceted innovation, 
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and, thus, Figures 2-5a and 2-5b capture vividly the impact of the multifaceted 
innovation on productivity and employment.  This cluster produces electrical fittings, 
such as switches, power outlets, and ampere meters for housing and office buildings.  
The employment in the cluster grew tremendously in the 1990s, as seen in the figures.  
A factor behind the fast growth is the rapid increase in the demand for the cluster’s 
products due to a construction boom.  The question, however, arises as to why Cluster 
5 grew much faster than other electrical fittings clusters.  The main reason is that 
Cluster 5 was the first to achieve multifaceted innovation in this industry in China 
(Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka, 2004).   
The innovation started with the adoption of simple quality inspection, followed 
by branding, the spread of the network of exclusive sales agents across the country, the 
expansion of firm size through purchasing factories, and the employment of managers 
as well as engineers who had high education and work experience in SOEs.  By 1990, 
only one firm had achieved all these changes.  This innovator is shown in Figure 2-5a 
as the largest firm.  Several other firms soon began imitating the multifaceted 
innovation and a few continued with it thoroughly to become larger than the innovator 
by 2000.  In the late 1990s, about a dozen of other firms began imitating these 
imitators.   
Having achieved the multifaceted innovation, firms produce higher-quality, 
higher value added products with higher efficiency, by using machinery more 
intensively and hiring more highly educated engineers and managers.  At the same 
time, they have expanded their firm sizes since their established brand names have made 
mass production and mass selling profitable.  Indeed, Figure 2-5b shows that among 
such firms, labor productivity and employment size are positively associated.  This 
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result lends support to Hypothesis 2.  
     Cluster 6 is the cluster of export-oriented garment firms in Dhaka, Bangladesh.  
The country started the production of garment items for export about three decades ago 
and has become one of the world’s largest garment producers (Mottaleb and Sonobe, 
2011).  The capital city, Dhaka, is the center of this industry, even though Chittagong, 
a port city, is another major cluster.  The industry was initiated when its first 
export-oriented firm sent 130 workers to South Korea for intensive training in 
production, quality control, international procurement, international marketing, and 
overall management.  Soon, other garment firms were established in Dhaka, equipped 
with the full set of expertise necessary for a successful kick-start.  Thus, unlike the 
other examples discussed in this paper, Cluster 6 had the multifaceted innovation in its 
incipient period.  
Mostly the current customers of the firms in this cluster are so-called global 
buyers, i.e., large retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers with well-known brands in 
developed countries.  The global buyers require their vendors like the garment firms in 
Cluster 6 to keep reducing production costs, shortening lead times, and improving 
product quality.  If a vendor fails to meet such requirements, it will soon be replaced 
by another vendor in the same country or in another developing country.  Many firms 
in Cluster 6 have stepped up the ladder of buyers from minor buyers to the top-class 
global buyers.  This fact indicates clearly that since its kick-start, Cluster 6 has 
continued with improvements in efficiency and product quality.   
Note, however, that this cluster’s growth has other features.  First, firms in this 
cluster have not established their own brand names because they are vendors for global 
buyers.  Without brand names and own distribution networks, mass production and 
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mass selling may not be profitable.  Second, the scope for mechanization is limited.  
Third, good management is critically important to take the full advantage of the 
abundant supply of low-wage workers in Bangladesh, and the role of technological 
innovation is much less important.  Probably, these features explain why a positive 
association between labor productivity and employment size is missing in Figures 2-6a 
and 2-6b. 
     Thus, the 12 panels of Figure 2 are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.  They 
also suggest that managerial capacities play an important role in determining 
employment size particularly in survival clusters, whereas innovative capacities enhance 
job creation in dynamic clusters.  Before closing this section, we would like to add that 
basic knowledge of management can be taught by business consultants to entrepreneurs 
of MSEs.  In recent years, an increasing number of randomized controlled experiments 
have been carried out to test the effectiveness of management training or consulting 
provided to entrepreneurs (e.g., Karlan and Valdivia, 2011; Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar, 
2010; Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar, 2010; Field, Jayachandran, and Pande, 2010; Bjorvatn 
and Tungodden, 2010; Mano et al., 2012).  These experiments have been conducted in 
various part of the developing world, but they share surprisingly similar results.  We 
also conducted management training experiments in Clusters 1 and 2, together with the 
results of experiments in two other survival clusters in Vietnam and Tanzania (see Table 
2) and obtained similar results.  The outline and main results of our experiments may 
be summarized as follows. 
     In each cluster, management training was provided to entrepreneurs in a 
classroom setting by local business consultants in local languages and by international 
consultants accompanied by an interpreter.  The program consisted of three modules: 
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marketing and entrepreneurship, production management including an introduction to a 
few basic concepts of Kaizen, and record keeping.  Before the program, we conducted 
a baseline survey of firms in the cluster and assigned sample firms randomly to the 
treatment group or the control group.  It was up to the entrepreneurs in the treatment 
group to decide whether to attend the training program, which lasted three weeks.7   
In the clusters in Vietnam and Tanzania, we also offered on-site training several 
months after the classroom training was completed.8  The assignment to the on-site 
treatment was random and independent of the random assignment to the classroom 
training.  Thus, some entrepreneurs received both types of training, some received no 
training, and others received either one of the two types.  The follow-up survey was 
conducted a year later in Cluster 2, but in the other clusters, it was conducted only three 
months after the on-site training was completed. 
     From these experiments, we have learned that entrepreneurs of MSEs have little 
awareness of basic management practices, that they soon understand the usefulness of 
such practices and become willing to learn how to apply them, and that roughly half of 
the participants put the new knowledge into practice.  Indeed, in all these clusters, the 
estimated impacts of the training effects on the adoption of various management 
practices that were taught in the program are positive and statistically significant.  
Another impact of the training program is found on the longevity of the firm.  In 
Cluster 2, while not a few firms in the control group stopped operation or completely 
closed down, there was no incidence of exit among the participants.  The difference 
                                                  
7 In the cluster of garment firms in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the training program had four modules 
and lasted four weeks.  Three modules were the same as in other study sites, and the fourth was 
about color coordination and other aspects of the design of garment items.  
8 In the on-site training program, instructors visited participants’ firms to teach them how to apply a 
simple technique of Kaizen to their workshop or factory, and the instructors visited the firm again to 
check if the application was going well and to give further advice. 
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was statistically significant.9     
As shown in Table 2, the estimated effects of training on the participants’ value 
added are insignificant or marginally insignificant, except for the on-site training in 
Tanzania.  Note, however, that the follow-up data in Vietnam and Tanzania were taken 
only six months after the classroom training and three months after the on-site training 
was completed.10  It is no wonder that the estimated effect is statistically weak.  
Moreover, these estimates neglect to take into account the favorable effect of the 
training on non-participants through knowledge spillovers.  Thus, the estimated effect 
on value added is likely to be only a small part of the social benefit of the training 
program. 
The cost of the training program per participants shown in Table 2 includes the 
costs of local and international consultants’ preparation of teaching materials, their 
travel and accommodation costs, and the cost of renting the venue.11  Note that the cost 
per participant shown in the table includes costs that can be saved, such as the cost of 
preparing teaching materials, if a training program is repeatedly provided. 
It is remarkable that the estimated effect tends to exceed the cost despite the 
overestimation of the cost and underestimation of the benefit in Table 2.  Thus, it is 
quite possible for future rounds of follow-up surveys to establish that the social benefit 
from the provision of the management training program exceeds the cost of the 
provision.  Moreover, there may be room for the improvement in the training contents. 
                                                  
9 In the other clusters, there has been no exit among the participants, even though there have been 
very few exits even among the non-participants. 
10 The training effects on value added in the Tanzanian case shown in Table 2 were estimated by 
comparing the quarterly value added from January to March in 2010 and those in 2011. 
11 The cost was low in Cluster 2, where international consultants were not hired, and the venue was 
provided by a nearby vocational school free of charge.  The cost was high in Tanzania, where a 
large room in a hotel in the center of the capital city was used as the venue, and the local lead 
consultant’s remuneration was high. 





     It is widely accepted that good management is critically important for firms, 
especially large firms consisting of many groups with different functions (e.g., Drucker, 
1973).  The present paper has found that management is important for MSEs as well, 
even though their operations seem very simple.  Among various aspects of 
management, particularly important for MSEs is to keep control of the production pace 
because wild fluctuations in production make the expansion of employment size highly 
risky and cause overproduction and other wasteful uses of resources.  It should be 
useful to teach MSEs the importance of record keeping and basic knowledge of 
marketing and workshop housekeeping.  Actually, the results of randomized 
experiments carried out recently, including our experiments in Vietnam, Ghana, and 
Tanzania, indicate that basic management training helps participants’ firms improve 
management practices, reduces the incidence of exit, and is likely to benefit participants 
enough to justify the cost of providing the training. 
     Our analysis, however, indicates that the provision of basic management training 
is not enough to help firms grow dynamically so that they can create ample job 
opportunities.  Dynamic firm growth is a result of multifaceted innovation led by 
entrepreneurship.  Thus, it is important to nurture entrepreneurs’ innovative capacity.  
Compared with managerial capacity, innovative capacity in general is probably more 
elusive and accordingly more difficult to teach to entrepreneurs.  Nonetheless, our 
review of dynamic cluster development suggests that there is a common pattern: 
dynamic clusters in different sectors in different countries have shared similar 
experiences of a series of innovations starting with product quality improvement 
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followed by branding, improvements in marketing, strengthening relationships with 
suppliers, and improvements in management of labor, inventory, and finances.  This 
finding brings new hope: innovative knowledge conducive to dynamic growth of firms 
and industries in low-income countries can be taught.  A considerable compilation of 
empirical studies of the operational practicalities of teaching management and 
innovation knowledge as well as the diffusion process of such knowledge is clearly 
warranted. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of selected industrial clusters  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 City (Country) Product Year No. of firms in 
the cluster a 




     mean median mean median  
1 Hatay (Vietnam) Knitwear 2009 170 19.5 9 600 383 R(1 year) 
   2010 160 20.1 10 573 470 = 0.38 
2 Kumasi (Ghana) Metalwork 2004 1,000b 5.6 5 564 294 R(2 years) 
   2008 1,000b 5.2 5 247 143 = 0.67 
3 Addis Ababa  Leather shoes  2000 1,200 13.1 4 245 167 R(2 years) 
 (Ethiopia)  2004 900 10.1 5.5 202 155 = 0.56 
4 Huzhou, Zhejiang Children’s wear 1990 5,000c 8.4 8 357 295 R(4 years) 
 (China)  1999 2,000 15.0 12 169 158 = 0.64 
5 Wenzhou, Zhejiang Electrical  1990 60 46.7 26 291 214 R(5 years) 
 (China) fittings 2000 120 338.6 110 603 431 = 0.54 
6 Dhaka Garment 2000 3,200d 697.5 350 449 298 R(1 year) 
 (Bangladesh)  2005 4,100d 1231.7 724 405 312 = 0.94 
Notes:  
a. Only the final goods producing firms are counted unless otherwise indicated. 
b. In the same cluster, a large number of car repairing garages and electricians are operating.  The total number of firms in the 
cluster is estimated to be more than 10,000.  
c. This number includes subcontractors. 
d. This is the number of export-oriented garment manufacturers, including firms outside Dhaka. 
e. This column shows the auto-correlation of labor productivity between 2009 and 2010 in Cluster 1, 2007 and 2008 in Cluster 2, 
2002 and 2004 in Cluster 3, 1997 and 1999 in Cluster 4, 1995 and 2000 in Cluster 5, and 2004 and 2005 in Cluster 6.  R(x 
years) stands for autocorrelation coefficient between year t and year t + x. 
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on annual value 
added (USD) a 
Estimator b 
Classroom-training    




Kumasi, Ghana  740 13,890* 
(8,339) 
ANCOVA 
BacNinh, Vietnam 2,050 27,302  
(35,211) 
DID-ITT 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  4,179 4,181* 
(2,218)  
DID-ITT 
On-site training    
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania  2,043 4,038** 
(1,987)  
DID-ITT 
Both classroom and on-site    
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 6,222 3,882* 
(2,309) 
DID-ITT 
Notes    
Standard errors are in the parenthesis.  * and ** indicate 10 percent and 5 percent 
significance, respectively.  Classroom training was conducted in July-August 2010 in 
Hatay, Vietnam, in November-December 2007 in Ghana, in July-August 2010 in 
BacNinh, Vietnam, and in May-June 2010 in Tanzania. On-site training in Tanzania was 
conducted in December 2010. 
a. The effects were estimated by using quarterly data in Tanzania. 
b. DID-ITT stands for difference-in-differences estimation of intention to treat analysis. 
ANCOVA stands for Analysis of Covariance, which controls for observed covariates 
as well as past outcomes in the estimation of treatment effect using training 
invitation as an instrumental variable. 
  




     Figure 1.  The effect of output fluctuation and risk aversion on employment size 
  




Mean APL = pF(L)/L 






p[ – pF(L)2]F'(L)  




     Figure 2-1a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Hatay (Vietnam) garment cluster, 2009 
 
      
     Figure 2-1b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Hatay (Vietnam) garment cluster, 2010 
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     Figure 2-2a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Kumasi (Ghana) metalworking cluster, 2004 
 
Figure 2-2b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Kumasi (Ghana) metalworking cluster, 2008 
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     Figure 2-3a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) footwear cluster, 2000 
 
      
     Figure 2-3b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) footwear cluster, 2004 
 
 




Figure 2-4a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Zhili (Zhejiang Province, China) garment cluster 1990 
 
 
Figure 2-4b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Zhili (Zhejiang Province, China) garment cluster 1999 
 
  




Figure 2-5a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Wenzhou (Zhejian Province, China) electrical fittings cluster, 1990 
 
 
Figure 2-5b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Wenzhou (Zhejian Province, China) electrical fittings cluster, 2000 
 
 




Figure 2-6a. Labor productivity and employment size 
Dhaka (Bangladesh) cluster, 2000  
 
 
Figure 2-6b. Labor productivity and employment size 
Dhaka (Bangladesh) cluster, 2005 
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